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Abstract — Grid Web Services are still relevantly a new to 
business systems, and as more systems are being attached to 
it, any threat to it could bring collapse and huge harm. 
Some of these potential threats to Grid Web services come 
in a new form of a new denial of service attack (DoS), 
called XML Denial of Service or XDOS attacks. Though, as 
yet, there have not been any reported attacks from the 
media, we have observed these attacks are actually far less 
complex to implement than any previous Denial of Service 
(DoS), but still just as affective.  Current security 
applications for grid web services (WS-Security for 
example), based on our observations, and are not up to job 
of handling the problem. In this paper, we build on our 
previous work called Service Oriented Traceback 
Architecture (SOTA), and apply our model to Grid 
Networks that employ web services. We further introduce a 
filter defence system, called XDetector, to work in 
combination with SOTA. Our results show that SOTA in 
conjunction with XDetector makes for an effective defence 
against XDoS attacks and upcoming DXDoS. 
 
Index Terms — Grid Web Service, Service-Oriented 
Computing, SOTA, XDectector 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The foundation for implementing a Service-Oriented 
Architecture (SOA) onto a grid network can be found 
in Service-Oriented Grid Computing (SOGC). It is 
mostly agreed upon, that Open Grid Services 
Architecture (OGSA) [1][2][3] is the cornerstone of 
SOGC, which describes itself as, a high level 
architecture abstraction of service–oriented grid 
computing, while Web Service Resource Framework 
(WSRF) [4] is the specification for implementing the 
OGSA model.  In the area of Security, OGSA employs 
WS-Security [8], XML-Signature [9], XML-
Encryption [10] to encompass message integrity, 
confidentiality and availability [6][7].  These standards 
work in conjunction with Simple Object Access 
Protocol (SOAP) [11], regardless of the transport 
protocol being used.   
 
The SOA model is currently adopted in various areas 
of distributed application development, for example 
design and implementing web applications. In the area 
of OGSA, SOA is mostly used by large scale 
corporations to help find, and share service resources, 
internally. It is, also, sometimes extended for external 
use, in order to expose corporate resources to the 
outside world. The results from this type of 
implementation, has earned corporations, billions of 
dollars in revenue. Though one of the downsides of 
this implementations, is they are totally dependent 
upon the SOA models, for their income. Any problems 
or threats, such as a Denial of Service (DoS) attack for 
example [13][14], to these services, would result in 
billion dollar losses and maybe corporate collapse.          
 
Probably the weakest part of the OGSA security, 
based on our observations, is message delivery and 
integrity, while security focus has been on message 
protection [12]. With this weakness, a gap has opened 
up and a new series of attacks are now available for 
those who would like to implement them. In fact, we 
could see headlines about these new attacks in the 
coming days and months. These new attacks have been 
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referred by researchers as XDoS (XML based DoS) 
and DXDoS (Distributed XML-based DoS) [21].  
 
The papers by Jenson et al. [6] and Padmanabhuni et 
al [21] discusses the depth of this problem by showing 
some of the effects of these attacks, and discuss how 
one might be able to prevent them. It should be noted 
at this time, we use the term DXDoS and XDDoS [21] 
as inter-changeable terms. One of the many reasons 
why an attacker would chose this new form of Denial 
of Service (XDoS) attack over previous DoS, is due to 
how much simpler and devastating these attacks are 
against Web Services. Secondly, there has been a lot of 
research on developing defense systems [13][14] 
against DoS and DDoS attacks, in order to prevent 
them. With XDoS, and soon DXDoS, these attacks are 
relevantly new, so counter measures or counter 
systems are under developed and in effect non-existent.  
 
In this paper, we follow on from our previous work 
[15][16] on Service-Oriented Traceback Architecture 
(SOTA), by applying our framework to OGSA. We 
further add to our work by introducing a defense filter 
called XDetector [XML Detector], in which it is 
distributed throughout the grid, in order to properly 
defend it. Our system is one of the first defense 
systems to attempt to defend against these new attacks, 
though we should point out that at the time of 
producing this paper, XDetector was trained and tested 
on the MIT Dataset [17], since no dataset with the new 
attacks has yet been produced, though we are in the 
works on developing such a set.  The remainder of the 
paper is made up of the following: Section 2 reviews 
the related work on SOTA. Section 3 covers the details 
of applying our SOTA framework, and XDetector, to 
OGSA. Section 4 presents our experiments and 
performance evaluation. Lastly, Section 5 provides our 
conclusions and future research.  
 
II. Related Work 
 
In this section, we discuss very briefly Service-
Oriented Traceback Architecture (SOTA) and the new 
forms of Denial of Service Attacks called XDoS.  
 
A. Service-Oriented Traceback Architecture  
 
SOTA is a web security service application that is 
product-neutral. Its main objective is to apply a SOA 
approach to traceback methodology. This is in order to 
identify a forged message id, since one of the main 
objectives of XDoS and DXDoS is hide the attacker’s 
true identity.  
 
The basis of SOTA is founded upon the 
Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM) [17] algorithm. 
DPM marks the ID field and reserved flag within the 
IP header. As each incoming packet enters the edge 
ingress router it is marked. The marked packets will 
remain unchanged as they traverse the network. 
Outgoing packets are ignored.  
 
DPM methodology is applied to our SOTA 
framework, by placing the Service-Oriented Traceback 
Mark (SOTM) within web service messages. If any 
other web security services (WS-Security for example) 
are already being employed, SOTM would replace the 
‘token’ that contains the client identification. Real 
source message identification are stored within SOTM, 
and placed inside the SOAP message. SOTM, as in 
DPM tag, will not change as it traverses through the 
network.  The composition of SOTM is made up of 
one XML tag, so not to weigh down the message, and 
stored within a SOAP header. Upon discovery of an 
XDos or DXDoS attack, SOTM can be used to identify 
the true source of forged messages.  
 
SOTA does not directly eliminate an XDoS or 
DXDoS attack message. This is left for the filter 
section of a defense system (Firewalls or our new filter 
XDetector). Instead SOTA’s two main goal is to deal 
with the two main objectives of XDoS, which are: 
exploit a known vulnerability, in order to bring down 
system. These vulnerabilities could be found in 
communication channels (flooding for example) or 
known exploits within the services provided (for 
example, an attacker can Overload their messages, 
which will result in the web server crashing). The 
second objective is that attackers try to hide their 
identity. The reasons vary, depending on what type of 
attack, but usually it is to cover their crime or to bypass 
a known defense that is in place to prevent it. It is with 
this second objective that SOTA attempts to cover, as 
other traceback methods, like Probability Packet 
Marking (PPM) [18] and DPM. 
 
There are many reasons for OGSA to employ a 
SOTA type framework, some of these are: 
 
• Current web security is not up to handling an 
XDoS or DXDoS attack. In fact, as Jension et 
al. shows how WS-Security can be used in an 
XDoS attack.  
• SOTA does not violate IP protocols, in order to 
store information for traceback purposes. 
•  Using the SOA model, SOTA can be employed 
on any ubiquitous grid system. 
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Figure 1.  Distributed XML-based Denial of Service attack, where 
an attacker has taken control of 2 Grids, and sending huge amounts 
XML-based traffic to Grid 0 Web Server. 
 
• With IPv6 coming into fruition [19], current IP 
traceback methods will no longer be viable. This 
is due to the changes that IPv6 introduces, such 
as, IPSec and the packet header format no 
longer holds support the fields that are required 
for IP traceback.    
 
B. XML-Based Denial of Service (XDoS) Attacks  
 
XDoS was a term coined by Padmanabhuni et al. 
[21], where web services are prone to XML based 
Denial of Service (XDoS). A Denial of Service (DoS) 
is where an attacker attempts to deprive legitimate 
users of their resources [20]. XDoS attack(s), 
according to Padmanabhuni et al, Jenson et. al. and 
Chonka et. al.  can affect the following area: Firstly, a 
network can be flooded with XML messages (instead 
of packets), in order to prevent legitimate users to 
network communication. Secondly, if the attacker 
floods the web server with XML requests, it will affect 
the availability of these web services. Lastly, attackers 
manipulate the message content, in order to cause the 
web server to crash. The experiments carried out by 
Jenson et al focuses on the last point, though they do 
not call their attacks XDoS.  
 
To adept XDoS into a Distributed Denial of Service 
paradigm, called Distributed XML based Denial of 
Service (DXDoS), the attacker uses multiple hosts to 
attack the victim with XDoS attacks (Figure 1). This 
type of attack, though none have been reported as yet, 
will be probably be the most serious threat to OGSA. 
 
Figure 2.  Distributed XML-based Denial of Service attack, where 
SOTA and XDectector are located just between the each Grid Web 
Service, in order to detect and filter XDoS attacks. 
 
II. XDoS Defense System for Open Grid 
Services Architecture 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Inherent internet characteristic, which comprise of 
limited and consumable resources, is one of the reasons 
why attackers are so successful. They can target 
bandwidth, processing power and storages capacities of 
a grid network. OGSA has limited resources, in order 
to provide services, which can be exhausted with a 
sufficient number of consumers. With this particular 
knowledge, attackers can instigate an XDoS or 
DXDoS. For example, an attacker can keep sending 
oversize messages to the web server over a period 
time. This will result in the web server to crash, since 
currently there is no restrictions to the size of message 
[6][21].  In a DXDoS attack, the attacker would order 
their agents/zombies to instigate a flood attack of 
oversize messages, against the web server. This again, 
would result in the web server to crash from either 
executing the oversize messages, or from 
communication congestion created from the flood 
 
B. Distributed Defense System 
 
Figure 2 shows our defense system to protect OGSA 
from XDoS and DXDoS attacks 
 
C. XDos – Detector (X-Dectector) 
 
The XML-Based Detector is trained Back Propagation 
Neural Network, in order to detect and filter out XDoS 
messages. A neural network is a set of 
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Post /Authorsdetails.asmx
<?xml version="1.0" encoding ="utf-8"?>
Soapaction: “getAuthorsLastname”  
<soap:Envelope
xmlns:soap="http://
schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/
XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:xsd="http://localhost:80 
XMLSchema">
<soap:Body>
<GetAuthorNames xmlns="http://
tempuri.org /" />
<getAuthorNames></
getAuthorNames>
… … ...
</soap:Body >
</soap:Envelope>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<soap:Envelope>
<soap:Header>
<True Source id="id1" 
soap:mustUnderstand="1"
soap:actor="http://
schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/actor/next">
<theToken 
xsi:type="xsd:string">this_is_the_ token
Soapaction: “getAuthorsLastname”
</theToken>
</True Source id>
</soap:Header>
<soap:Body >
<GetAuthorNames xmlns="http://
tempuri.org/" />
<getAuthorNames></
getAuthorNames>
<getAuthorNames></
getAuthorNames>
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
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Figure 9.  Sensitivity of Neural Network 
 
Figure 10.  Filtered DDoS attack traffic from our Neural Network 
 
in that as soon as the traffic starts to deviate it takes the 
neural network a few moments to begin to filter the 
attack traffic.   
 
V. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
 This paper builds upon our previous paper [14][15], 
in which identifies the real source of XDoS attack 
messages, and filters in order to protect Grid Web 
Services. SOTA is a traceback system that is 
constructed on the basis of Web Services. Loose 
Coupling, Policy Based, Message Based and Dynamic 
discovery are some of criteria employed by the SOTA 
framework. XDetector, is a Back Propagation Neural 
Network, trained to detect and filter XDoS attack 
message.  
 
The empirical data from our experiments shows that 
SOTA is efficient and effective. The experimental data 
also shows that SOTA is able to traceback to the 
source. Once an attack has been discovered and the 
attacker’s identity known, XDetector can filter out 
these attack messages. The people, who will be 
interested in this research, are those that want to their 
protect web services in a cheap and efficient manner.    
 
Currently, we are planning to move our research on 
to the Deakin’s Enterprise Grid. This will give us 
access to real-time data and see what the advantages 
and disadvantages of SOTA and XDectector are.  
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